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By William A. McEachern
This April marks one decade since state taxpayers
filed their first returns under the new income tax.
That tax hit the state like an earthquake, and after-
shocks continue even today. It created a fountain-
head of revenue paid primarily by higher income
households. But the state now faces its first budget
shortfall of the income tax era. What have we
learned from the experience?
Even if state lawmakers can make ends meet this
year, which is far from certain, they still need to
patch a projected $650 million breach in the $13.5
billion budget for next fiscal year. This is the third
shortfall in the last two decades, each coinciding
with an economic recession. New spending pro-
grams during the 1980s and tax cuts during the
1990s contributed to the shortfalls. Both decades
ended badly, as the economy soured and revenues
fell short.  Let’s see what happened.
The 1980s 
Faced with a budget gap in the early 1980s
amounting to about $200 million, or 6% of the bud-
get, lawmakers raised some tax rates and expanded
the sales tax base. These hikes combined with an
improving economy to generate budget surpluses.
Flush with revenue, legislators doubled state aid to
local schools from $850 million in 1985 to $1,654
million in 1990, boosting teacher pay to the highest
in the nation.
To put the 1980s in perspective, let’s see what
happened to the revenue burden for state govern-
ment. A comprehensive measure of this
burden is the general revenue that state
government raises from its own sources
(i.e., excluding aid from the federal
government) measured as a percent of
personal income of state residents. In
Connecticut, this increased from 7.3%
in 1980 to 7.8% in 1990. The average
for all states fell from 8.9% to 8.2%.
For Connecticut local governments,
however, own-source general revenue
(i.e., excluding state and federal aid)
fell sharply from 6.1% of personal
income in 1980 to 4.8% in 1990. In the
nation, the local burden also fell—from
7.7% to 6.6%. 
So by 1990, Connecticut’s state rev-
enue burden moved up toward the
national average, but the local burden
fell further below the national average.
Connecticut’s revenue burden increased
at the state level in part to fund higher
school aid to localities, thereby decreas-
ing the burden at the local level.
The 1990s 
The Great Recession of the early 1990s helped dig
the budget hole that led to the income tax, but
other factors compounded the problem.  As men-
tioned already, the state sharply expanded aid to
local schools, but it did so with essentially the same
revenue base it had at the beginning of the 1980s.
In 1990, Connecticut’s rates on existing taxes were
already among the highest in the country, so raising
them further seemed counterproductive. For exam-
ple, increasing the highest-in-the-nation sales tax
above 8% would have encouraged more residents to
shop elsewhere. What’s more, that tax, once
deductible on federal returns, lost its privileged sta-
tus with passage of U.S. tax reforms in 1986.
Corporate tax rates were also the highest around,
as were rates on interest, dividends and capital
gains.  Faced with a huge budget shortfall and with
few alternatives, lawmakers turned to the income
tax. They developed a tax reform package that
included reductions in other taxes.  The new tax not
only closed the budget gap, it allowed the sales tax
to drop from 8% to 6% and it covered the $625 mil-
lion lost when the tax on interest, dividends and
capital gains was repealed. 
Rumor had it that the architects of the new tax
fiddled with combinations of exemptions and cred-
its until upper income households paid the lion’s
share. The idea was to give generous tax breaks to
lower and middle income taxpayers, then strip
those breaks as income increased.  And that’s pretty
much how things worked out. The top 1% of tax
filers based on adjusted gross income pay more of
total state income taxes than the bottom 86% put
together. The bottom third of filers pay little or
nothing, and the median taxpayer averages less
than $2 a day (see page 9 for a Webster Survey of
residents’ attitudes about the tax).
Income tax revenues gushed during the roaring
1990s, enough to lower the rate from 4.5% to 3% at
the low end and to provide a property tax credit of
up to $500 to all except high-income filers. The cor-
porate tax rate was cut from highest in the nation to
23rd from the top. Inheritance and estate taxes were
also peeled back.
Despite cuts in some other tax rates, the income
tax harvested so much revenue that general revenue
from state sources jumped from 7.8% of personal
income in 1990 to 9.2% in 1999. The national aver-
age increased more modestly from 8.2% to 8.4%.
Thus, the state revenue burden in Connecticut by
1999 exceeded the national average (see the upper
chart). Connecticut’s local revenue burden
increased slightly from 4.8% in 1990 to 4.9% in
1999; the national average stayed at 6.6% (see the
lower chart).  Incidentally, the combined state and
local revenue burden in Connecticut increased from
12.6% in 1990 to 14.1% in 1999; the national aver-
age increased from 14.8% to 15.0%. So, though
Connecticut’s combined burden rose during the
decade, it remained below the national average.
Soaking the Rich?
Why haven’t high-income filers complained more
about paying most of the tab? First, 4.5% is still
below the top rate imposed by 33 of the 43 states
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with an income tax. The top rate is 6.8% in New
York, 5.6% in Massachusetts, and about 10% in
Rhode Island.
Second, since the state income tax is deductible
on the federal return, this lowers the bite from
4.5% to more like 2.7% for those in the top feder-
al bracket. The deductibility of state income taxes
allows Connecticut residents to export hundreds of
millions of dollars of the state income tax burden
to the rest of the country. 
Third, before our broad-based income tax was
introduced, most high rollers were already paying
the tax on interest, dividends, and capital gains at
rates that reached 14%, the highest in the nation
by far.  Some got a tax cut when the broad-based
income tax was adopted.  
And fourth, many filers who worked in border-
ing states paid less when the income tax was
introduced. Here’s why. A Greenwich economist
working in New York pays income taxes to New
York on her earnings there, then gets a credit for
that payment against her Connecticut return, thus
erasing her Connecticut liability on that income.
She still pays Connecticut taxes on other income—
but at a 4.5% rate instead of 14%. 
This last point works to Connecticut’s advantage
for those working in Connecticut but living else-
where. Before Connecticut’s income tax, this group
paid income taxes to their state of residence
(except for New Hampshire). They now pay taxes
here and get credit on their home state return,
with no change in their overall burden.
Connecticut collects over $300 million a year from
non-residents or part-year residents. Most of this
money was simply paid to other states when
Connecticut had no broad-based income tax.
In light of the above, the General Assembly may
be tempted to close the projected budget gaps by
simply raising the top rate on high-income filers.
But that’s dicey. When Connecticut adopted a
broad-based income tax, it lost its unique status,
especially with chief executives who get to choose
where to locate corporate facilities. We minimized
the damage by keeping the tax rate relatively low,
but it wouldn’t take much to lose that small
advantage. For example, just a one-percentage
point increase would virtually match the rate in
Massachusetts.  
And the new tax has broader implications for
the economy. For example, it may have stalled our
economic recovery during the 1990s and slowed
our population growth to only 3.6%, fourth slow-
est nationally. Population in the seven states with-
out an income tax grew an average of 22.9%
between 1990 and 2000, double the 11.4% average
for states with an income tax.   We should be care-
ful about inferring causality from this, since differ-
ences in demographics, living costs, climate, and
the like also shape population patterns. Still, we
should think twice before raising the top income
tax rate.
The author is Editor Emeritus of The Connecticut Economy
and Professor Emeritus at UConn. The sixth 
edition of his textbook, Economics: A Contemporary
Introduction, will be published this spring.
By Art Wright
The economy is once again in recession, and gold has again turned to dross in
the State’s budget.  The surpluses that funded tax rebates just a short time ago
have morphed into deficits that seem to swell with each passing week.  Like clock-
work, deficit politicking is in full swing.  Republicans and Democrats disagree over
how big the deficit will be, and also over how to cope with it—cut spending, raise
taxes, issue new debt, or dip into State budget reserves?
The Capitol sausage machine is working as usual, but the problems seem less
severe than the last time.  Then, State politicos exhausted budget reserves in fis-
cal years 1988-1991 before biting the bullet and passing the current income tax,
which took effect in September 1991.  (See William A. McEachern’s article on
the facing page.)  This time, the recession’s effects seem to have been milder,
and going into the downturn the State’s Rainy Day Fund was full at its target 5%
of spending.  Recent State surpluses were used to fund capital projects and one-
time outlays as well as to retire debt.
The Governor and the General Assembly deserve pretty good marks for their
husbandry of Connecticut’s fiscal resources over the past decade.  Our elected
officials have largely resisted the temptation to match strong revenue growth
with new spending.  How to use surpluses, the Rainy Day Fund, and new debt
—to stabilize spending, fund capital projects, or start new programs—is still the
stuff of political debate.  But that is inevitable, and right.
Longer term, though, some see the pink if not rosy budget picture fading if
certain structural problems in state finances prove tougher than now anticipated.
Dimensions of the Current Deficit
The general-fund budget for FY 2002 that the General Assembly passed in
June 2001 was in balance at $11.9 billion in revenues and appropriations.  (The
total budget also includes more than a billion dollars in “special appropriations,”
80% of it “Special Transportation Funds.”)  By the end of last year, a gap of
more than $550 million had opened up in that budget.  Several rounds of spend-
ing cuts and other maneuvers beginning in September brought the projected
deficit down to $165 million as of this writing.  For comparison, the Rainy Day
Fund stood at about $600 million in July 2001, according to estimates in
Governor Rowland’s proposed FY 2002 budget, completed in February 2001.  
Budget pains in the vicinity of 4-5 percent of originally targeted appropriations
pale by comparison with the woes of some other states.  A December 2001
report by the respected Fiscal Studies Program of the Rockefeller Institute of
Government at SUNY-Albany put Connecticut near the bottom of the heap of
troubles.  Measuring projected FY 2002 budget shortfalls as a percentage of FY
2000 expenditures, the study found Alaska (with a double whammy from lower
oil prices on top of the recession) at the top at 28.3%, trailed by Minnesota at
17.0%, and Arizona at 11.2%.  In New England, Maine was in Connecticut’s
league, while Rhode Island, Vermont, and Massachusetts were in the next higher
tier.  (New Hampshire was not part of the analysis.)
Grounds for optimism?  Smugness may be premature, given (a) the trend in
the State’s deficit since last summer; (b) the underestimate by the Rockefeller
Institute of the size of Connecticut’s FY 2002 shortfall ($96 million); and (c)
warnings (e.g., by Economy.com, the regional/national forecasters) that New
England, late to the recession, may not have seen the worst of it yet (Wall Street
Journal, “Regional Report,” January 23, 2002, p. B12).
The usual suspects underlie Connecticut’s current budget difficulties.  The
economic slowdown, prudently assumed in advance for the FY 2002 budget,
turned into a slump.  New appropriations, mostly recession-driven, now total
$74.4 million.  And tax revenue growth that was expected to tail off, instead
went south: at mid-fiscal-year, the Office of Policy and Management (OPM) is
projecting that personal income tax revenues will drop by more than $90 million
(nearly 2%) from FY 2001, and sales tax collections by more than $35 million
(1.1%).  Big drops in projected corporation and inheritance-and-estate taxes
(respectively, $119.3 and $92.8 million) were largely anticipated, reflecting
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